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Two cases dealt with general definitional problems in the sales tax area.
The first, Alamo Hardwoods, Inc. v. BullockI, addressed the remodeling
exclusion found in the definitions of "sales price" and "receipts" under
article 20.01.2 These definitions govern the computation by which the tax
is determined. In Alamo Hardwoods the taxpayer was in the business of
selling lumber and frequently conducted milling operations upon the lum-
ber, such as making decorative designs on the wood surface and preparing
it for joining. The taxpayer billed its customers for the milling service but
did not collect any sales tax on the receipts attributable to these activities,
* B.A., J.D., Vanderbilt University. Attorney at Law, Johnson, Swanson & Barbee,
Dallas, Texas.
1. 614 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(D) (Vernon 1969) provided:
(D) Receipts.
(1) 'Receipts' means the total amount of the sale or lease or rental price, as
the case may be, of the retail sales of taxable items by retailers, valued in
money, whether received in money or otherwise, without any deduction on
account of any of the following:
CO) The cost of the materials used, labor or service costs, interest paid,
losses or any other expenses.
(2) 'Receipts' does not include any of the following:
(g) The amount charged for labor or services rendered in installing, apply-
ing, remodeling, or repairing the tangible personal property sold.
Article 20.01(D) has since been repealed, revised, and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.007 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
The term sales price was defined in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(L) (Vernon 1969)
which read:
(L) Sales Price.(1) 'Sales Price' means the total value amount for which taxable items are
sold, valued in money, whether paid in money or otherwise, without any de-
duction on account of any of the following:
(b) The cost of material used, labor or service costs, interest paid, losses, or
any other expenses.
(2) The total amount for which a taxable item is sold includes all of the
following:
(a) Any services which are a part of the sale.
(3) 'Sales Price' does not include any of the following:
(g) The amount charged for labor or services rendered in installing, apply-
ing, remodeling, or repairing the tangible personal property sold.
Article 20.01(L) has since been repealed, revised, and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.007 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
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based on the theory that these receipts were excluded from tax because
they merely constituted a service charge for "remodeling" within the
meaning of the statute. The comptroller argued that amounts received for
such services were taxable because the services constituted compensation
for processing or fabricating operations, which should be included in the
sales price of the items sold. The court agreed with the comptroller, hold-
ing that, in order to constitute "remodeling" within the meaning of the
statute, the article must retain its identity after the work on it is per-
formed.3 The court distinguished the taxpayer's primary authority, Calvert
v. Julian Gold, Inc., which excluded from the sales price the cost of altera-
tions of women's ready-to-wear clothing,4 finding that the mill work oper-
ations of the taxpayer extended far beyond the alterations involved in
Calvert because, after the milling operations, the nature of the lumber was
changed and it could serve a different purpose than before the work was
performed.'
The second case, State v. B.F Goodrich Co. ,6 construed the tax exemp-
tion allowed under article 20.04(E)(1)(b) 7 for tangible personal property
consumed in manufacturing operations. The state sought to tax materials
used to wrap the rubber latex used in the manufacture of tires on the theo-
ries that (1) the wrapping was "incidental to" rather than "necessary and
essential to" the manufacturing process and therefore was not tax exempt;
and (2) the wrapping was subject to tax because it was used in the trans-
portation of the product rather than in its manufacture. Facts adduced at
trial showed that the rubber was useless without the wrapping because of
contamination and "cold flow," and because the unwrapped blocks of syn-
thetic rubber would stick to one another. The court found that the materi-
als were necessary and essential to the manufacturing process, and
therefore tax exempt.8
3. 614 S.W.2d at 604.
4. 479 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. 614 S.W.2d at 604.
6. 617 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
7. See TEX. TAX.--GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(l)(b) provided:
There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter the receipts from
the sale, lease or rental of, and the storage, use or other consumption in this
state of:
(b) tangible personal property used or consumed in or during any phase or
such actual manufacturing, processing or fabricating operation, provided that
the use or consumption of such tangible personal property is necessary or es-
sential to the performance of such operations .... The exemption provided
herein does not include the following:
(iv) tangible personal property used by a manufacturer, processor or
fabricator in any activities other than the actual manufacturing, processing or
fabricating operation such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and
supplies used in selling or distributing activities, in research and development
of new products, or in transportation activities.
Article 20.04(E)(l)(b) has since been repealed, revised, and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
8. 617 S.W.2d at 838. Two other 1981 cases illustrate problems that arise with respect
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A number of legislative changes occurred in the sales and use tax area.
The basis upon which an item purchased for resale or under an exemption
certificate is taxed if put to a divergent taxable use was changed. The Tax
Code now provides that tax will be imposed on the fair market rental value
of the item during the divergent use. 9 If the item has no fair market rental
value, the normal sales tax is appplied as it was under prior law. In the
alternative, the purchaser may pay tax based on the original sale price. 10
The new law represents a significant liberalization of rules, since under
prior law, the normal sales tax was applied at the time the divergent use
occurred." The legislature also increased from $750 to $1,500 the amount
a taxpayer may collect on a monthly basis before being required to for-
ward taxes to the comptroller monthly. 12 In addition, the application of
transit authorities' sales and use taxes in the case of transactions originat-
ing inside an authority area, but involving shipment or delivery to a pur-
chaser outside the area, was modified. 13 In this circumstance, the item is
exempted from the authority's sales tax. If the purchaser, however, is lo-
cated in another authority that has adopted the local sales and use tax, the
item will be subject to that authority's use tax.14
Exemption provisions were also the subject of legislative action during
the survey period. The sales and use tax exemption for medical equipment
and devices was broadened to include therapeutic appliances and devices
and therapeutic supplies designed for those appliances and devices, if the
items dispensed are prescribed by a licensed practitioner of the healing
arts. 15 Receipts from taxable items sold to organizations exempt from fed-
eral income taxes are also exempted from sales and use tax provided the
items sold are related to the purpose of the organization.16 Additionally,
receipts from the sale of tangible items manufactured or assembled by per-
sons 65 years or older are exempted if sold at a fund-raising drive spon-
sored by a nonprofit organization solely to provide assistance to elderly
persons. 17
The Texas Legislature also enacted a tax on interest charges paid to a
to the scope of sales tax exemptions. Highway Contractors, Inc. v. West Tax. Equip. Co.,
617 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (vendor's attempts to collect tax
after sale consummated); Bullock v. W & W Vending & Food Serv., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 713
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (status of exemption for sales to instrumentalities of
the United States government).
9. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.154 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
10. d §§ 151.154-.155 (Vernon Pam. 1981). The amendment also (1) requires that any
portion of a sale excluded from "sale price" or "receipts" be separately identified on the
invoice or sales slip, id § 151.007; (2) exempts items donated to certain organizations from
tax if the purchaser has not made any other divergent use, id § 151.155(b); and (3) changes
deficiency notice requirements to allow notices to be sent on a monthly and yearly basis as
well as quarterly, id § 151.507.
11. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.031 (Vernon 1969) (repealed 1979).
12. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.401 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 11 18y, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1981).
14. Id § 16(f)(2)(F).
15. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.313(5) (Vernon Pam. 1981).
16. Id § 151.310.
17. Id § 151.332.
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retailer with regard to the sales tax portion of the price for an item that is
purchased on credit.' 8 The act is applicable to state and local sales and use
taxes, metropolitan and rapid transit authority taxes, and regional trans-
portation authority taxes. A retailer who operates on a cash basis account-
ing system and sells taxable items on credit is required to remit to the
comptroller the higher of one-half of the amount of interest received on
credit for payment of the sales tax or the amount of all interest minus an
amount of interest received at the rate of 9%, provided that the interest
charged on the sales tax portion and on the sales price portion is the
same. 19
The Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts was extremely active
in promulgating rules in the sales tax area during the survey period.
Among the most significant pronouncements was the planned treatment of
the sales of federal tax benefits now permitted by section 168(0(8) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,20 which was added by the Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981. The comptroller held that a "safe harbor" lease
was not subject to sales or use tax when neither title to nor possession of
tangible personal property was transferred. 21 This rule creates substantial
uncertainties regarding the proper treatment of a sale of federal tax bene-
fits when the federal tax lessor requires that he receive title to the property
to protect himself against disqualifying transfers by the federal tax lessee.
The comptroller also changed the tax exemption rules regarding occa-
sional sales. The rule now provides that a person who becomes a retailer
by making a third sale of taxable items within a twelve-month period is no
longer required to collect or pay tax on the first two sales. 22 Further, a
retailer may now make an occasional sale of an item that the retailer does
not sell or offer for sale in the regular course of business, and no tax need
be collected on that sale. 23 For example, a corporate aircraft or certain
capital assets may now be sold in an occasional sale even though the seller
is engaged in the retail business of selling other, unrelated, items.24
In addition, the comptroller altered existing administrative positions and
ruled that devices used in the thermo-chemical production of methanol are
taxable. 25 Further, the comptroller restated the rules concerning the appli-
cability of sales tax to food, food products, meals, and food services, and
changed rules regarding the taxation of food sales through vending ma-
chines. 26 Rules were also developed regarding the taxability of electrical
18. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.05(L) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
19. Id
20. I.R.C. § 168(0(8).
21. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.071, 6 Tex. Reg. 4356 (1981).
22. Id Rule 026.02.20.036, 6 Tex. Reg. 2693 (1981).
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id Rule 026.02.20.065, 6 Tex. Reg. 1001 (1981). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.27
(Vernon Pam. 1981) now excludes such devices from the definition of solar energy devices,
which are exempt from tax.
26. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.013, 6 Tex. Reg. 3175 (1981).
The new rule reflects the existing agency policy of taxing certain food sales through vending
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transcriptions, 27 and those regarding advertising agencies 28 and motion
pictures, video tapes, and films were amended.29
Several rule changes reflect legislative developments of the past year. A
rule was adopted to conform the regulations governing the exemption of
therapeutic appliances, devices, and related equipment to recent legisla-
tion.30 Another rule was issued to implement legislative changes regarding
the divergent use of a taxable item purchased under a resale certificate. 3'
Changes in the rules also implement the increase in the monthly filing lim-
its from $750 to $1,500 and the change in the interest rate on delinquent
taxes from 7% to 10%, effective January 1, 1982.32 Other rules outline the
seller's tax responsibilities, in light of recent legislative changes, when a
divergent use is made of a taxable item purchased under an exemption
certificate, and explain the proper use of exemption certificates and the
seller's responsibilities in accepting or issuing the certificates. 33 Finally,
rules were adopted (1) broadening the exemption for federal tax-exempt
organizations, 34 (2) implementing legislative changes made regarding the
divergent use of property,35 and (3) making minor clarifications of existing
laws or clarifying the vendor's responsibility.36
In a series of administrative decisions, the comptroller addressed several
issues. In Decision 11,266 he considered the extent to which transportation
expenses should be included in the sales price of goods ordered in advance
by customers. 37 Decision 10,274 addressed the extent of the sales tax ex-
machines only when the vending machine operator provides eating facilities. The rule now
also requires a retailer who provides eating facilities to collect sales tax on all individual
sized packages or portions sold where a microwave oven is available for customer use. Id.
27. Id, Rule 026.02.20.029, 6 Tex. Reg. 2181 (1981).
28. Id., Rule 026.02.20.041, 6 Tex. Reg. 2182 (1981).
29. Id, Rule 026.02.20.070, 6 Tex. Reg. 2184 (1981).
30. Id., Rule 026.02.20.004, 6 Tex. Reg. 4063 (1981). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.313 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
31. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.005, 6 Tex. Reg. 4064 (1981).
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.154 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
32. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.006, 6 Tex. Reg. 4064 (1981).
See also id., Rule 026.02.20.055, 6 Tex. Reg. 4068 (1981); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.060,
.401 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
33. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.007, 6 Tex. Reg. 4064 (1981).
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.155 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
34. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.008, 6 Tex. Reg. 4065 (1981).
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.310 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
35. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.066, 6 Tex. Reg. 4070 (1981).
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.154-.155 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
36. See Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.20.022, 6 Tex. Reg. 1688
(1981) (setting forth seller's sales tax responsibilities regarding credit sales, bad debts, and
repossessions); id, Rule 026.02.20.011, 5 Tex. Reg. 4991 (1980) (clarifying tax exemption
allowed contractors when improving real property belonging to exempt organizations and
extending the tax exemption to all property used in the performance of a contract for an
exempt organization); id, Rule 026.02.20.028, 5 Tex. Reg. 4900 (1980) (excluding from the
tax base the amount charged for separately stated mandatory maintenance of computers).
37. Tex. Comptrollers Administrative Decision No. 11,266 (1981). The comptroller
decided that, although a customer's "order" for special order goods may be accepted by a
retailer before the expense of transporting goods from his supplier's location to his own
location has been incurred, the "sale" between the retailer and his customer did not occur,
according to § 151.005 of the Tax Code, until after the goods had been delivered to, and
19821
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emption for property used to improve the realty of an exempt organiza-
tion.38 In Decision 11,064, the comptroller considered the taxable status of
machinery and equipment purchased for use in drying and storing grain, 39
and in Decision 11,928, he ruled that a purchaser inherited the sales tax
liability of a business to the extent of the fair market value of the consider-
ation given for the business. 40
II. FRANCHISE TAXES
Several cases, three new statutes, and various administrative pronounce-
ments reflect the developments in the franchise tax area during this survey
period. In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bullock4' the Texas Supreme Court
considered the procedure to be followed by a taxpayer seeking to report its
franchise tax liability using the "three-factor" formula, rather than the
"gross receipts" formula.42 While the taxpayer qualified to use the three-
factor formula, the comptroller's rule43 required the taxpayer to file a peti-
tion fifteen days prior to the franchise tax filing deadline in order to obtain
permission to use the three-factor formula. The taxpayer failed to petition
for use of the thee-factor formula fifteen days prior to the report filing
deadline; therefore, the comptroller computed the taxpayer's franchise tax
based on the gross receipts formula and assessed a deficiency. The court of
were segregated at, the retailer's location for the purpose of transferring title and possession
thereof to the customer. Accordingly, the comptroller held that the expense of transporting
the goods to the retailer's location was incurred before the sale between the retailer and the
customer occurred and had to be included as part of the sales price subject to sales tax. See
also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 157.007 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
38. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,274 (1981). The comptroller
held that all tangible personal property used in the performance of a contract for the im-
provement of realty for an exempt organization was exempt from sales tax to the extent of
such use, without regard to whether the property was directly or indirectly used. In so hold-
ing, the comptroller invalidated rule 026.02.20.011 to the extent that they excluded property
indirectly used in the performance of such contracts. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts,
Rule 026.02.20.011, 5 Tex. Reg. 2401 (1980). See also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311
(Vernon Pam. 1981).
39. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,064 (1980). The comptroller
held that corporate purchases of machinery and equipment for a drying and storing facility
were not tax exempt under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316 (Vernon Pam. 1981) prior to
September 1, 1975, because the machinery was not used on a farm or ranch, and because it
was not used in production. Furthermore, the machinery was not exempt after September 1,
1975, because the original producer of the grain was not a corporate entity. Arguments for
exemption under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.324 (Vernon Pam. 1981) were also rejected.
40. Tex, Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,928 (1981). The comptroller
held that the purchaser of a business owing sales tax to the state is personally liable for the
amount of tax owed to the extent of the value of the consideration given for the business. He
further held that since a promissory note was a negotiable instrument with an ascertainable
market value on the date it was given, the purchaser who gives such a note in consideration
for the business was liable for the amount of sales tax owed by the seller to the extent of the
note's market value on the day of the transfer, although the purchaser had not yet been
required to make any payments on the note. Id
41. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 144 (Jan. 23, 1982).
42. Id
43. Tex. Comptroller of Public Accounts, Rule 026.02.12.003 (1975), TEX. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. tit. 34 § 3.393 (McGraw-Hill 1981).
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civil appeals, holding for the taxpayer, concluded that article 12.02(2) 44
permitted the use of the three-factor method without requiring any ad-
vance petition.45 The court also held that the comptroller's rule was inva-
lid, because (1) the administrative convenience that the advance filing
requirement provided was minimal; and (2) the advance filing effectively
was a penalty upon a taxpayer greater than that permitted by law.46
On appeal the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule was
valid and stating that courts must uphold administrative rules if they are
reasonable. 47 The court further stated that the rule was not inconsistent
with the statutory provisions authorizing refunds, and the application of
the rule to the taxpayer did not amount to a penalty. 48
The court in Bullock v. Ramada Texai, Inc. 49 addressed the proper date
to be used to determine corporate ownership of property in computing
franchise tax under the assessed value method. Under this method pro-
vided by article 12.01(l)(b), 50 the taxpayer determined its franchise tax lia-
bility based on the assessed value of its property for ad valorem tax
purposes. The taxpayer argued that the controlling date for purposes of
determining assessed value was the January 1 that fell within the corpora-
tion's preceding fiscal year, but the comptroller argued that the last day of
the corporation's preceding fiscal year controlled. Overruling the lower
courts, the Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the comptroller, holding
that article 12.01(l)(b), which provided that the tax be imposed upon "the
assessed value for County ad valorem tax purposes of the property owned
by the corporation in this State," 51 had to be read in conjunction with
article 12.08, which provided that the taxpayer's franchise tax report show
"the condition of such corporation on the last day of the corporation's
44. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(2) (Vernon 1969) providing an alternative to the
gross receipts formula for use in appropriate cases read:
(2) If the allocation and apportionment provisions of Section (1) of this
Article do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in
Texas, the taxpayer may petition for and the Comptroller may permit, in re-
spect to all or any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable:
(a) Separate accounting;
(b) The inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly repre-
sent the taxpayers' business activity in Texas; or
(c) The employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable alloca-
tion and apportionment of the taxpayer's capital.
Article 12.02(2) has since been repealed and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.108
(Vernon Pam. 1981).
45. Bullock v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 619 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981).
46. Id The difference in the two tax computations exceeded the maximum 10% penalty
permitted by TEX. TA.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Article 12.14 has
since been repealed and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.362 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
47. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 144-45.
48. Id at 145-46.
49. 609 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1980).
50. TEX. TAX.--GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(l)(b) (Vernon 1969) (repealed 1981). Ramada
Texas, Inc. is of historical interest only, since this method of computing franchise tax was
abolished. Effective May 1, 1981, the provisions of TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-.003
(Vernon Pam. 1981) replace art. 12.01. See notes 62-68 infra and accompanying text.
51. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01(1)(b) (Vernon 1969), repealed and recodoed at,
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
1982]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
preceding fiscal year."' 52 The court ruled that the legislative rationale of
the preceding provisions was to tax the corporation "based on its holdings
going into the fiscal year for which the tax is levied."
53
In CRA, Inc. v. Bullock 54 the supreme court held that a foreign coopera-
tive association was not an association organized under the Cooperative
Association Act because it had only one member. 55 The association, there-
fore, was not exempt from payment of franchise taxes, even though it was
related to an organization that was exempt.
56
In another case, Bullock v. Ensearch Exploration, Inc. , the court con-
sidered the question of whether sales of natural gas, delivered in Texas to
interstate pipeline companies for resale outside of Texas, constituted "busi-
ness done in Texas."'58 If so, the taxpayers' gross receipts then would be
included in their business done in Texas, and the taxpayers' franchise taxes
would be increased because the portion of their capital allocated to Texas
was to be determined by multiplying total taxable capital by gross receipts
from business done in Texas over total gross receipts. 59 In Ensearch Explo-
ration the taxpayers sold the gas they produced to interstate transmission
companies that transported it to the ultimate destinations outside of Texas.
The court of civil appeals held that the sale of natural gas by the taxpayers
was completed within the state of Texas and therefore was taxable.60 The
court further held that, for purposes of the tax, the sale occurred when the
gas was sold, delivered, or shipped within Texas, and the fact that the gas
eventually moved in interstate commerce was irrelevant.
6
'
52. 609 S.W.2d at 539. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.08 (Vernon 1969), repealed and
recodfied at, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.153 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
53. Id.
54. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-50.1 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1982).
55. 615 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1981).
56. Id at 178.
57. 614 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02 (Vernon 1969) provided:
(1)(a) Each corporation liable for payment of a franchise tax shall deter-
mine the portion of its entire capital taxable by the state of Texas by multiply-
ing same by an allocation percentage which shall be the percentage
relationship which the gross receipts from its business done in Texas bear to
the total gross receipts of the corporation from its entire business.
(b) For the purpose of this Article, the term "gross receipts from its busi-
ness in Texas" shall include:
(i) Sales of tangible personal property when the property is delivered or
shipped to a purchaser within this State, regardless of the F.O.B. point or
other conditions of the sale ....
Article 12.02(I)(a) has been repealed and recodified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106
(Vernon Pam. 1981). Article 12.02(b) was also repealed and codified at TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.103 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
59. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(a) (Vernon 1969).
60. 614 S.W.2d at 217.
61. Id at 218-19. A large part of the tax apparently arose out of transactions occurring
from 1969 through 1975, when a Texas attorney general's opinion, No. M-829 (1971) and an
August 4, 1971, letter of the comptroller precluded the collection of the taxes in question.
The court held that a reversal of the position of the comptroller and the attorney general did
not prohibit retroactive collection of the taxes, because an erroneous administrative interpre-
tation of the statute could not invalidate its clear and unambiguous meaning. Id at'218.
The court also held that the statute as interpreted did not violate the commerce clause of the
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Farris v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. 62 illustrated the effects of failure to
pay franchise taxes. A California corporation had failed to pay its Texas
franchise taxes and, pursuant to statutory procedures, 63 the secretary of
state forfeited the corporation's certificate of authority to do business in
Texas. The California corporation was subsequently sued for breach of
contract in federal court. The court held that, because the corporation's
certificate had been forfeited, it had no standing to sue or defend in Texas
courts.6 4
The Texas Legislature made a number of minor modifications in the
franchise tax. The use of a corporation's assessed value for county ad
valorem tax purposes as a basis for computation of the franchise tax was
abolished. 65 Thus, the only remaining alternatives are to pay a franchise
tax of $4.25 per $1,000 or fractional part thereof of taxable capital, or $55,
whichever is greater.66 Certain corporations 67 must now pay a franchise
tax equaling one-fifth of the above amount, but in no case less than $55.68
Effective May 1, 1982, nonprofit corporations organized for the sole pur-
pose of, and engaging exclusively in, providing emergency medical serv-
ices 69 and homeowners' associations organized as nonprofit corporations 70
are exempted from franchise taxes.
Several administrative pronouncements addressed the issue of whether
certain items were taxable as capital under Tax Code section 171.101.71 In
one administrative decision, the comptroller defined the standards to be
used in determining whether advances from a parent to a subsidiary
should be classified as nontaxable debt or taxable contributions to capi-
tal.72 The comptroller held that the same factors used by the Internal Rev-
enue Service would be applied by the comptroller. 73 In applying these
U.S. Constitution, because the tax met the tests of Washington Revenue Dep't v. Stevedor-
ing Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734 (1978), and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), since the tax (1) had a substantial nexus with the state; (2) was fairly apportioned;
(3) did not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) was fairly related to services
provided by the state. 614 S.W. 2d at 219. The court also distinguished Michigan-Wiscon-
sin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954), which struck down as unconstitutional a
Texas franchise tax imposed on the "gathering" of gas rather than its sale. The court distin-
guished this decision by noting that in Ensearch Exploration the sale of gas, not the transfer
of possession, was the basis for the tax, and furthermore, no other state could use these
transactions as the basis for imposing a tax. 614 S.W.2d at 219.
62. 498 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
63. TEX. TAX.--GEN. ANN. art. 12.14(2) (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1980), repealed and re-
codifoed at, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.251-.254 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
64. 498 F. Supp. at 147.
65. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
66. Id
67. The statute covers corporations incorporated for the purpose of owning or operating
street railways or passenger bus systems or electric interurban railways, regulated public
utilities, and corporations paying an annual tax on intangible assets under Texas law. Id
§ 171.003(a).
68. Id § 171.003(b).
69. Id § 171.083.
70. Id § 171.082.
71. Id § 171.101.
72. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,576 (1981).
73. The IRS focuses primarily upon the intent of the parties, the formalities of the
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factors the comptroller determined that the advances were nontaxable debt
of the subsidiary. 74 The attorney general issued an opinion stating that a
holding company's investment in a subsidiary should be valued at cost for
franchise tax purposes, and that cost was a fact question to be determined
on a case-by-case basis by the comptroller. 75 Another administrative deci-
sion from the comptroller determined that treasury shares and accounts for
items such as personal injury and freight loss or damage were taxable capi-
tal and that certain equipment trust certificates were taxable debt.76
III. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
Perhaps the most significant procedural development of the year was the
codification of the tax statutes, except those involving ad valorem property
taxes, as title 2 of the Tax Code.77 While the enactment of title 2 purport-
edly constitutes merely a nonsubstantive revision of the statutes, it is possi-
ble that some unintended changes in the law occurred. Also, the
legislature enacted some new statutes having some impact on tax proce-
dure. A ten percent interest rate was enacted on refunds of erroneously
collected taxes78 and on payments of delinquent taxes;79 procedural rules
were enacted regarding the comptroller's audit and collection practices;80
and rules also were provided to ensure the confidentiality of information
gathered by the comptroller or attorney general in the course of a tax
audit.8 1
Three cases addressed miscellaneous procedural issues. Two of these
transaction, the history of repayment, whether an expectation of repayment was reasonable,
and the debt/equity ratio of the subsidiary. Id
74. Id
75. TEx. ATr'Y GEN., Op. No. MW-364 (1981).
76. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 6851 (1980). See also TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.101 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
77. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-211.301 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
78. Id §§ 111.104-. 108. Under prior law a six percent interest rate applied only to re-
funds resulting from a court judgment. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.1 A (Vernon 1969)
(repealed 1981). Under the new act the 10% interest rate is applied to any refund arising out
of an erroneous collection of taxes, penalties, or interest, even if the refund resulted from an
administrative decision rather than a court judgment. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.104-
.108 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
79. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 211.259 (Vernon Pam. 1981) (raising the interest rate from
seven percent to ten percent).
80. Id § 111.001-.016. These provisions permit the comptroller, if the taxpayer agrees,
to conduct a sample audit rather than a detailed audit, id § 111.0042; require taxpayers to
keep tax records open for four years, id § 111.0041; and grant the comptroller subpoena and
discovery powers in a prehearing context as well as in a contested case, id § 111.0043. Addi-
tionally, the statute of limitations on assessment of taxes was extended to four years. Id
§ 111.201. Taxes may be assessed at any time, however, in cases (1) involving the filing of
false returns with an intent to evade taxation, (2) of failure to file a return, or (3) of error,
where the correction of the error would increase the tax by at least 25%. Id § 111.205. After
a deficiency or jeopardy determination, the comptroller has three years to bring suit to col-
lect taxes. ld § 111.206.
81. Id § 111.006. This section provides a general rule of confidentiality, but authorizes
the comptroller and attorney general to use such information in enforcing provisions of the
Tax Code and in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the United States, Texas,
or another state is a party. Id
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cases dealt with the protest requirement of the Tax Code, which restricts
court jurisdiction over a refund action to situations in which (1) the tax
was paid under protest, and (2) the protest sets out in detail every ground
or reason why the protester contends the demand for the tax is unlawful.82
In Bullock v. Amoco Production Co.83 the comptroller initially concluded
that Amoco had underpaid its taxes by approximately $250,000 for 1962
and had overpaid them by $718,000 during the succeeding eight years. In
1972 the comptroller tendered to Amoco the difference between the over-
payment and the asserted deficiency. Amoco contested this finding in a
redetermination hearing, but was unsuccessful; therefore, the comptroller's
order became final on March 21, 1975. On the same day, Amoco brought
suit contesting the 1962 liability. The state, however, contended that
Amoco could not maintain the suit because it had not complied with the
protest requirements, since Amoco failed to bring the suit within ninety
days after payment of the tax. The comptroller's argument that the pay-
ment of tax had occurred when he offset the 1962 deficiency against the
credit for later years, was upheld by the supreme court. 84 The result of this
case was changed by the amendments to the Tax Code, and now a tax-
payer is permitted to take an appeal from a final decision of the
comptroller.3 5
The tax protest provisions were also at issue in Suleman v. McBeath.86
The focus in Suleman was on the jurisdictional prerequisite that required
that the tax protest set out fully and in detail each and every ground or
reason for the protest.87 The taxpayer paid a deficiency assessment and
stated, in a letter accompanying the payment, that the tax was "being paid
under protest because I believe that the tax computation was erroneous."88
82. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969), repealed and recodifled at, TEx.
CODE ANN. § 112.051 (Vernon Pam. 1981). Article 1.05(1), before its repeal and recodifica-
tion read:
Any person, firm, or corporation who may be required to pay to the head of
any department of the State Government any occupation, gross receipts,
franchise, license or other privileged tax or fee, and who believes or contends
that the same is unlawful and that such public official is not lawfully entitled
to demand or collect the same shall, nevertheless, be required to pay such
amount as such public official charged with the collection thereof may deem to
be due the state, and shall be entitled to accompany such payment with a
written protest, setting out fully and in detail each and every ground or reason
why it is contended that such demand is unlawful or unauthorized.
(2) Sufts for recovery of taxes or fees. Upon the payment of such taxes or
fees, accompanied by such written protest, the taxpayer shall have ninety (90)
days from said date within which to file suit for the recovery thereof in any
court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas, and none other ....
The issues to be determined in such suit shall be only those arising out of the
grounds or reasons set forth in such written protest as originally filed. ...
Id.
83. 608 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. 1980).
84. Id at 901.
85. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.151 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
86. 614 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969). For the text of this article, see note
82 supra.
88. 614 S.W.2d at 638.
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The state sought to have the case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, ar-
guing that the written protest did not meet the requirements of the statute.
The court concluded that the protest was jurisdictionally sufficient, but it
limited the taxpayer's protest to a showing by the taxpayer of computa-
tional error. 89 The court did not determine what constituted a "computa-
tional error" but remanded the case for consideration of this and other
issues.90
On another front, an issue regarding the proper audit procedures to be
followed by the comptroller was raised in Southwestern Motor Transport,
Inc. v. Bullock. 91 The taxpayer was a regulated transportation company
keeping two sets of books: one to comply with the requirements of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and one in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The ICC books were the
relevant books for a sales tax audit, and the GAAP books were the appro-
priate set of books for a franchise tax audit. Because of a misunderstand-
ing, the taxpayer presented to the comptroller the ICC books, and the
comptroller used these in conducting a franchise tax audit. At an exit con-
ference, the taxpayer learned for the first time that a franchise tax defi-
ciency would be asserted, and at that time sought to have the auditor
review the GAAP books. The auditor refused to examine them on the
grounds that they were "not held out to be a general ledger during the field
work of the audit" and were mere "working papers. '92 The court found
that the comptroller's long standing departmental construction of the law
was that the books and records of a corporation in compliance with GAAP
were to be used in determining franchise taxes, and held that the comptrol-
ler was required to examine those books during the audit of franchise tax
reports.93 Accordingly, the taxpayer's refund position was upheld. 94 The
court also cited from the "Comptroller's Procedure Manual," which sets
forth internal administrative procedures to be followed by the comptrol-
ler's auditors, and the court suggested that the taxpayer had the right to
require an auditor to comply with the dictates of that manual.95 An inter-
esting aspect of the opinion is the court's apparent finding that the comp-
troller was required, as a matter of law, to compute the franchise tax based
on the GAAP books because of a long standing administrative history of
basing computation of the tax on such books. Thus, the case suggests that
a long standing policy of the comptroller may be binding upon him and
that internal administrative procedures formally prescribed in the manual
may create certain procedural rights for taxpayers.
Finally, a number of administrative pronouncements were made regard-
ing procedural matters. The comptroller expressed his view of what con-
89. Id at 639-40.
90. Id at 638.
91. 614 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
92. Id at 641-42.





stituted reasonable diligence for purposes of determining whether a waiver
of penalty was appropriate 96 and expressed the necessity of proving the
facual basis of an insolvency claim when such a position was relied upon
to compromise or settle a tax liability. 97 The comptroller also promulgated
a regulation regarding the procedure to be followed when a taxpayer re-
quests a more definite statement of the factual and legal bases for the
comptroller's determination.98
IV. INHERITANCE TAX
The Texas inheritance tax was completely amended by the Texas Legis-
lature, and such amendments were effective September 1, 1981. 99 Under
prior law, the tax was the total of (1) the basic inheritance tax, an excise tax
levied on the privilege of receiving property from a decedent determined
by the amount of property received by each recipient and by the recipient's
relationship to the decedent,' °° and (2) the additional inheritance tax,
which increased the total tax to the extent necessary to permit the state to
take maximum advantage of the federal credit for state death taxes al-
lowed under section 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code.' 0 The amend-
ments eliminated the basic inheritance tax and imposed a tax equal to the
amount of the federal credit, as calculated under sections 2011 and 2012 of
the Internal Revenue Code, upon transfers at death of the property of resi-
dents, nonresidents, and aliens.' 0 2 In addition, a method was provided to
apportion the federal credit among states claiming portions of the credit, 03
and a tax was imposed on generation-skipping transfers."' 4
The major benefit of these changes is to simplify substantially the inheri-
tance tax. Texas thus has abandoned an independent inheritance tax sys-
tem in favor of accepting the amount allowed by the federal government
for state death taxes. The provisions governing administration, enforce-
ment, and collection of inheritance taxes and generation-skipping taxes
were also revised to accord with the new tax system.' 0 5 In general, the
revision provided that filing deadlines and payment requirements corre-
spond with those required for federal estate taxes. 06
V. PROPERTY TAX
The most significant developments in the property tax area during the
96. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 11,749 (1981).
97. Tex. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 10,478 (1981).
98. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Rule 026.01.01.008, 5 Tex. Reg. 4790 (1980)
(requiring petitioner to submit written questions addressed to specific parts of determination
within fifteen days of comptroller's letter).
99. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 211.001-.259 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
100. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. arts. 14.01-.11 (Vernon 1969) (repealed 1981).
101. Id art. 14.12 (repealed 1981); I.R.C. § 2011.
102. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 211.051-.053 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
103. Id § 211.051(b).
104. Id § 211.054.




survey period were statutory. The new Property Tax Code became fully
effective on January 1, 1982,107 and the constitutional10 8 and statutory' °9
amendments required counties to participate in the new unified appraisal
districts. Further, the new State Property Advisory Board was active and
began to promulgate proposed administrative rules." 0 In addition to these
developments, the courts were active in a variety of areas.
One case considered the construction of Property Tax Code provisions
concerning the governance of the new unified appraisal districts. In
Huffman v. City of Arlington I ' the court analyzed the so called "three-
fourths" rule governing the composition of an appraisal district's board of
governors. In general, the new code provides for a single appraisal district
in each county governed by a five-member board of directors which per-
forms all ad valorem property tax appraisals." 2 The participating taxing
units within the district are to elect the board of directors; each district is
entitled to a number of votes based on its proportionate share of the total
dollar amount of property taxes imposed within the district. ' 3 Previously
this method of voting could be altered by vote of three-fourths of the units
entitled to vote.' '4 The Huffman case addressed the limits of this prior
rule.
In Huffman three-fourths of the taxing units adopted a method of select-
ing members under which Tarrant County was divided into five subdis-
tricts. Each taxing unit had the right to vote only on the director for the
subdistrict within which it was placed. The method adopted by the taxing
units was contrary to the provisions of section 6.03(c), which allowed a
type of cumulative voting that would ordinarily permit a taxing unit to
vote for more than one director.' '5 The effect of the plan was to dilute the
voting strength of the city of Arlington from one vote in fifteen to one vote
in sixteen.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found that the three-fourths
107. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 1.02-.12 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
108. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 18(c).
109. TEx. TAX.CODE ANN. § 6.01-.11 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
110. Id §5.01.
111. 619 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
112. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
113. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.06(d) (Vernon Pam. 1981).
114. Prior to repeal § 6.03(i) provided:
The governing bodies of three-fourths of the taxing units that are entitled to
vote on the appointment of members of a district's board of directors may
change the number of members on the board of directors or may change the
method of selecting members of the board of directors.
1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Spec. Session, ch. 13, § 167(a), at 182.
115. Section 6.03(c), prior to amendment, provided:
Members of the board of directors are appointed by vote of the governing
bodies of the incorporated cities and towns and the school districts that par-
ticipate in the district. A governing body may cumulate its votes by multiply-
ing the number of votes to which it is entitled by this section by the number of
directorships to be filled and by casting that total for one candidate or distrib-
uting it among candidates for any number of directorships.
1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 841, § 6.03(c), at 2225.
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majority rule set forth in section 6.03(i) did not give to the three-fourths
majority the power to change the basic formula set forth in section
6.03(d).1 6 Although the reasoning of the court was somewhat cryptic, it
apparently held that the proportionate voting power of a taxing unit may
not be reduced under section 6.03(i).1 17 Based on an analysis of the mean-
ing of the term "method" in section 6.03(i), the court concluded that the
taxing units could change only the details for holding the election under
that provision." 8 Therefore, the number of directors on the board may
perhaps be changed, provided that the basic cumulative voting scheme of
section 6.03(d) is not changed. It seems probable that the meaning of this
provision will eventually be determined by the supreme court. 1 9
Two cases dealt with the ongoing peculiarities of ad valorem taxes as
applied to bank stock. Bank of Texas v. Childs120 considered the validity
of a tax on bank shares assessed by Dallas County under articles 7150.6
and 7166 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.' 21 The bank argued first
that, since article 7166122 provided that bank shares could not be taxed at a
116. Section 6.03(d) set forth a specific method for computing the number of votes a
taxing unit was entitled to cast. The section stated:
The voting entitlement of a taxing unit that is entitled to vote for directors is
determined by dividing the total dollar amount of property taxes imposed in
the district by the taxing unit for the preceding tax year by the sum of the total
dollar amount of property taxes imposed in the district for that year by each
taxing unit that is entitled to vote, by multiplying the quotient by 1,000, and
by rounding the product to the nearest whole number. A taxing unit partici-
pating in two or more districts is entitled to vote in each district in which it
participates, but only the taxes imposed in a district are used to calculate vot-
ing entitlement in that district.
1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 841, § 6.03(d), at 2225. The court set out the formula in the
following manner:
Total Taxes Imposed (in District) by Taxing Unit x 1000 =
Total Taxes Imposed in District
(rounded to nearest whole number)
619 S.W.2d at 428.
117. 619 S.W.2d at 428.
118. Id
119. The problem in Huffman has arisen in at least one other case. In City of Houston v.
Rodehever, 615 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) three-
fourths of the forty-three local taxing units m Harris County voted to change the number of
directors on the appraisal board from five to nine. They also voted to change the method of
computing the voting entitlement of the taxing units from a tax dollar basis to a population
basis. Apparently, this alteration substantially diluted the city's representation on the board.
The case was dismissed at the trial court level based on the procedural issue, and was re-
versed and remanded by the appeals court without reaching the substantive issue. 615
S.W.2d at 839.
120. 615 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
121. These provisions were repealed concurrently with the implementation of the new
Property Tax Code. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 302, § 1, at 686 (art. 7150.6); 1885 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 111, § 2a, at 106, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 726 (1898) (art. 7166). A similar
tax is permitted by the new Property Tax Code. See TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 11.02(b)
(Vernon Pam. 1981).
122. Before its repeal, article 7166 provided:
Every shareholder of said bank shall, in the city or town where said bank is
located, render at their actual value to the tax assessor all shares owned by
him in such bank. . . . Nothing herein shall be so construed as to tax Na-
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greater rate than other monied capital in the hands of individuals, and
since article 7150.6123 specifically exempted such other monied capital
from taxation, article 7150.6, therefore, impliedly repealed article 7166.124
The court rejected this argument, noting that repeals by implication were
not favored, and concluded that the only provision of article 7166 that
arguably was repealed by article 7150.6 was the last sentence, which lim-
ited the rate of tax on banks or their shareholders to the rate assessed
against other monied capital. 25 The court next considered the taxpayer's
argument that the tax was unconstitutional because shares of nonbanking
corporations and most other intangible personal property were exempt
from tax, and therefore the tax on bank shares contravened the Texas Con-
stitution providing that "[tjaxation shall be equal and uniform.' 26 The
county responded that under the constitution as amended effective Janu-
ary 1, 1979, taxation of intangible property was permitted, but not re-
quired. The court interpreted this amendment to mean that the legislature
might tax intangible property, or exempt it, or tax certain classes of intan-
gible property and exempt others; accordingly, no violation of a state con-
stitutional provision was found.' 27
The taxpayer also argued that the tax was invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion because shares of nonbanking corporations were not taxed. The court
found, however, that bank shares formed a class of stock that, for tax pur-
poses, could reasonably be distinguished form other intangible property,
including other shares of stock, because banks enjoyed powers and privi-
leges not granted to other corporations. 28 Finally, the taxpayer argued
that the failure to deduct the value of the federal securities held by the
bank from the bank's net assets before apportioning their value pro rata in
determining the value of the shares made the method of assessment ille-
gal. 129 In a lengthy analysis of federal law, the court found that the United
tional or State banks, or the shareholders thereof, at a greater rate than is
assessed against other monied capital in the hands of individuals.
1885 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 11, § 2a, at 106, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 726 (1898).
123. Before its repeal, article 7150.6 provided that "[e]xcept as provided by Subsection
(b) of this article, intangible property is exempt from ad valorem taxation .... Intangible
property is taxable ad valorem if its taxation is provided for by article ... 7166." 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 302, § 1, at 686.
124. 615 S.W.2d at 813.
125. Id For the text of article 7166, see note 75 supra. The court further noted that it
might not be necessary to find the last sentence of article 7166 repealed in order to uphold
the tax in this case. 615 S.W.2d at 814.
126. 615 S.W.2d at 815. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
127. 615 S.W.2d at 815.
128. Id.; accord Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps, 288 U.S. 181 (1933) (holding that a
state legislature can make reasonable classifications to allow taxation on banks, while ex-
empting other financial corporations that compete with banks).
129. The bank claimed that the tax was illegal under 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976) which
provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and
other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or
under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every
form of. taxation that would require that either the obligations of the interest
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States had consented to the taxation of federal securities held by national
and state banks.' 30 While portions of the opinion seem to be of historic
interest only, other portions have continuing importance in any contest
regarding the validity of the tax now imposed on bank stock by the Prop-
erty Tax Code. Particularly relevant is the court's rejection of the state and
federal statutes consenting to the ad valorem taxation of federal securities
in the hands of a bank.
In the second case involving the ad valorem taxation of bank stock, City
of Midland v. Midland National Bank, the court found that the holding of
mere legal title to real estate did not suffice to permit a bank to reduce the
tax on its bank stock by the amount of taxes paid on the real estate.' 3' In
general, a share of bank stock is taxed only for the difference between its
actual cash value and the proportionate amount per share at which the
bank's real estate is assessed. 132 Relying on this provision, the bank sought
to enjoin the city from assessing the stock a value that did not reflect a
reduction for the value of certain real property. The bank, as a land own-
er, had entered into a ground lease with a third party, who constructed a
building and leased a portion of the building back to the bank. The third
party and the bank then divided equally the profits from leasing the re-
mainder of the building to other tenants. The bank neither listed the real
property as a part of its assets to be used in computation of its stock values,
showed the building on financial information filed with the Comptroller of
the Currency, nor listed it as an asset on its financial statements. In addi-
tion, the building was not taken into consideration in arriving at the value
of the bank's capital stock for purposes of ad valorem taxes. The court
held for the city, reversing the judgment of the lower court. 133 Since the
tax was due on the difference between the value of the real estate and the
thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of
the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu
thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.
Id 615 S.W.2d at 816.
130. 615 S.W.2d at 817. The court cited Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573
(1866) involved a tax levied by the City of Albany, New York, on stockholders of the First
National Bank. All of the capital stock of the bank consisted of stocks and bonds issued by
the United States and the stockholders' position was that such stock was not subject to state
or local taxation. The New York courts affirmed the ability of the assessors to tax such
stock. On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that a state possessed the power to
authorize the taxation of shares of national banks even when the capital consisted totally of
United States stocks and bonds. Id. at 582. See also 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976) (allowing a
national bank to be treated as a bank organized under the laws of the state); Cleveland Trust
Co. v. Lander, 184 U.S. 111 (1902) (bank shareholders are not entitled to a deduction equal
to the amount of capital stock of the company invested in United States obligations).
131. 607 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
132. Before its repeal, article 7166 stated: "Each share in such bank shall be taxed only
for the difference between its actual cash value, and the proportionate amount per share at
which its real estate is assessed." 1885 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 2a, at 106, 9 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 726 (1898). This principle has been carried forward in TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 23.11(a) (Vernon Pam. 1981), which states: "The stock of a banking corporation
. . . is appraised by subtracting the market value of real property owned by the bank from
the actual cash value of the bank's stock." Id
133. 607 S.W.2d at 304.
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stock, the court concluded that the difference could be ascertained only by
correct figures as to the value of both components, and therefore, a proper
determination could occur only if the value of the building was included in
the list of property used in fixing the value of the stock.' 34 In the court's
view, the purpose of the real estate clause in article 7166 was to prevent
double taxation. 135 Because the bank paid taxes on the building but did
not include it in computing the value of its capital stock, the court found
that no double taxation had occurred and that the bank, therefore, was not
entitled to deduct the value of the building. 136 The holding in City of Mid-
land creates a substantial impediment to the common use of leaseback and
profit sharing arrangements such as the one described above. 137
County of Harris v. Xerox Corp. 138 addressed the constitutionality of ad
valorem taxes imposed on imported property stored in local customs
bonded warehouses pending sale and shipment to a foreign country.
Xerox assembled copying machines in Mexico and then shipped them
under bond to Laredo, Texas, where they were placed in customs bonded
warehouses. The machines were then transported by bonded trucking
companies to customs bonded warehouses in Houston. The machines re-
mained in the warehouses until they were placed aboard deepwater ship-
ping vessels to be transported to Latin American countries.' 39 Xerox
asserted that ad valorem taxes imposed by Harris County violated the im-
port-export clause of the United States Constitution. 140
Relying on Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages' 4 1 the court found that a non-
discriminatory ad valorem tax did not infringe upon the import-export
clause when the imported goods being taxed were no longer in transit.142
The court determined that the goods in Xerox were not in transit, based
upon a three-part test: (1) was there a stoppage in transporation, and if so,
what was the purpose of the stoppage? (2) at the time of taxation, was the
final destination of the goods determinable? and (3) was the stoppage a
necessary delay of accommodation to the means of transporation, or for
134. Id
135. Id
136. 607 S.W.2d at 304. Cf. City of Abilene v. Meek, 311 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1958, writ refd) (holding that art. 7166 required assessed value to be used instead
of book value in tax computations).
137. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
138. 619 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
139. The copiers remained in the Houston warehouse for an average of 7-1/2 to 25
months, depending upon the model line. 619 S.W.2d at 405.
140. Id The import-export clause states: "No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its Inspection Laws .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
141. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). Michelin Tire involved a county ad valorem property tax as-
sessment against a corporation that imported tires and tubes, and stored gem in a ware-
house located in the county. The corporation sued, arguing.that the assessment violated the
import-export clause. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the tubes that remained in
cartons were immune from taxation, but the tires had lost their immune status because they
were mingled with other tires in the warehouse. Id at 281. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the nondiscriminatory assessment against imported goods no
longer in transit did not violate the import-export clause. Id at 302.142. 619 S.W.2d at 406.
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business purposes and profits of the company?143 Applying these criteria,
the court found that a transportation stoppage existed because of business
purposes of Xerox; that on taxation day the goods' final destination was
not determinable; and that the business purpose in stoppage was profits for
Xerox. 44 Accordingly, the court found that the copiers were no longer in
transit, and held that the import-export clause was not violated by imposi-
tion of the ad valorem taxes.' 45 The court next addressed the issue of
whether the tax imposed was discriminatory and therefore violated the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Distinguishing Mc-
Goldrick v. Gu/Oil Corp.,146 in which congressional legislation preempted
New York sales taxes on certain oil sales to foreign bound vessels, the
court concluded that since Congress had not enacted similar legislation to
protect the copier industry, there was no violation of the commerce
clause's prohibition against state taxation interfering with federal regula-
tion of foreign commerce. 47 The court further found that the tax was
nondiscriminatory, since the taxing authorities furnished Xerox with such
amenities as port facilities, police and fire protection, and streets for in-
gress and egress.148 The court held that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax did not violate the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution when the domestic owner of property imported and warehoused
such property for his convenience until a buyer could be found and the
property exported. 149
In Determan v. City of Irving150 the city of Irving challenged the validity
of an amendment to a city charter that limited the city's taxing power. The
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id. The court also concluded that the fact that the copiers were in the custody of
customs officials and stored in customs bonded warehouses did not operate to preempt local
taxing authorities. fd,. see Koysdar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974) (de-
spite certainty of exportation, goods warehoused in the taxing jurisdiction not protected
from state ad valorem tax by the import-export clause when the goods have not physically
entered the export stream); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 271
Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969) (when goods in transit for export are halted for
business purposes, they may be subject to taxation).
146. 309 U.S. 414 (1940). McGoldrick involved a New York City tax levied on fuel oil
manufactured in New York City from crude petroleum which had been imported from a
foreign country. After processing, the oil was sold to ships engaged in foreign commerce.
The Supreme Court found that such a tax would conffict with the congressional policy of
freeing crude oil importers from taxation on oil so that they could compete with foreign oil
suppliers. The state tax, therefore, was invalid as an infringement of the congressional regu-
lation of commerce. Id at 429.
147. 619 S.W.2d at 407.
148. Id
149. Id Xerox apparently had a letter of exemption from ad valorem taxes received from
the officer of the tax assessor-collector for one of the years in issue. The court found that this
letter did not estop the county from collecting the tax for that year, noting that the letter was
requested in July rather than on or before the taxing date of January 1, and that the reply
was not received until August 9th. Id at 408.
150. 609 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). The city brought its chal-
lenge under TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 717m-1 (Vernon Supp. 1982) which provides a
declaratory judgment procedure under which a taxing authority may test the validity of
certain actions. Id; 609 S.W.2d at 567.
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amendment, similar in theory to the famous Proposition 13 added to Cali-
fornia law, 151 limited increases in ad valorem taxes to six percent per year
in the aggregate and to eight percent per annum on the property of any
individual property owner, provided that no improvements were made to
the property. The court found that the amendment to the city charter was
invalid because it violated the contract clause of the federal Constitution
and the Texas Constitution. 5 2 Noting that the contract clause applied to
municipal by-laws and ordinances, 153 the court held that the charter
amendment impaired obligations previously entered into by the city.'
54
The city previously had contracted in its outstanding bonds to levy suffi-
cient taxes for repayment of the bonds, and the amendment was inconsis-
tent with this contractual undertaking. 55  The court rejected the
appellant's argument that no impairment of the city's obligation had oc-
curred because there had been no default on the bonds.' 5 6 The combina-
tion of the charter amendment and a reduction in federal revenue sharing
funds raised the potential that the tax rate would be insufficient to meet the
city's debt service requirement. This potential for insufficiency, according
to the court, impaired the obligation of contract and made the charter
amendment void.157 While this case may not put to rest in Texas so-called
tax revolt provisions, the case at least indicates that draftsmen should exer-
cise great caution to avoid infringing on the vested rights of preexisting
debt holders.
In Querner Trucklines, Inc. v. Texas' 5 8 the court of civil appeals consid-
ered the legality of a property seizure by a tax collector, pursuant to article
7266,15 9 prior to a judicial determination that the taxes were due. Article
151. CAL. CONST. art. 13A.
152. Id. at 569. The contract clause of the federal constitution reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver; Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The contract clause of the Texas Constitution reads: "No bill
of attainder . . . or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made." TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 16. The court also upheld the constitutionality of article 717m-1. 609
S.W.2d at 567.
153. 609 S.W.2d at 569. See Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S.
548 (1914) (a municipal ordinance or by-law enacted under power delegated from the legis-
lature is a state law); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867) (contract
clause of the federal constitution applies to contracts entered into by states and
municipalities).
154. 609 S.W.2d at 570.
155. Id at 570-71.
156. Id. at 570.
157. Id. at 570-71. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (hold-
ing that the contract clause may be activated by an unquantified financial loss or the poten-
tial for financial loss resulting from a legislative act).
158. 610 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), writ refd n.r.e., per curiam, 615
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1981).
159. 1887 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 133, § 1, at 128, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 926
(1898) (formerly TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7266 (Vernon 1960)):
If any person shall fail or refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him or his
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7266 provided that if a person failed or refused to pay taxes imposed upon
him or his property for a certain period of time, then the tax collector
could seize and levy upon so much of his personal property as would be
sufficient to pay the taxes.160 The court recognized that a seizure and levy
statute was not open to constitutional objection because it dispensed with
some of the formalities of ordinary judicial procedure, so long as a tax-
payer was given an opportunity at some point of the proceedings before his
rights were finally cut off to contest the validity of the tax.161 Finding that
under article 7266 the taxpayer had to obtain legislative permission to sue
the state before he could claim a refund,1 62 the court held that the statute
provided the taxpayer with no efficient and adequate right to contest his
liability either before or after the seizure, and, therefore, article 7266 was
unconstitutional. 163 The tax delinquency provisions have been revised
substantially in the new Property Tax Code;' 64 therefore the extent of the
relevancy of the Querner case to cases arising under the new statutes is
uncertain.
In City of Austin v. Davis165 the court considered the issue of personal
property's tax situs in the context of aircraft. The taxpayer had moved the
aircraft from an airport within the taxing jurisdiction where he resided to
an airport outside it. The city and school district of his domicile still
sought to collect delinquent taxes for 1974 assessed against the aircraft.
Applying the general rule that personal property could acquire a tax situs
apart from the domicile of the owner if kept in another place with suffi-
cient permanency, 66 the court determined that, on the facts presented, on
January 1, 1975, the aircraft had not acquired an independent tax situs. 167
The taxpayer informed the old airport that he would not hangar his air-
craft there after December 1974 and that he would move the plane as of
January 1, 1975. The court, however, found no evidence that as of Janu-
ary 1, 1975, the airplane was in any way distinguishable from other aircraft
located at the new airport on a purely temporary basis, and that no evi-
dence existed that the airplane was in "continual use"'168 at the new airport
property. . . the tax collector shall, by virtue of his tax roll, seize, and levy
upon and sell so much personal property belonging to such person as may be
sufficient to pay his taxes, together with all costs accruing thereon ....
160. Id
161. 610 S.W.2d at 534.
162. Id;cf. Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151 (1960) (a suit that will subject
the state to liability cannot be maintained without the consent of the legislature).
163. 610 S.W.2d at 534. But cf. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (mere
delay of judicial inquiry does not deny due process, as long as the opportunity for ultimate
determination of the tax liability is adequate).
164. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-.54 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
165. 615 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ granted).
166. See, e.g., State v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 242 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the situs of personal property for taxation purposes is
the owner's domicile unless the property has acquired an actual situs of its own).
167. 615 S.W.2d at 319.
168. "Continual use" was the test required by Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equali-
zation, 419 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1967) (for property to gain a new tax situs, it is sufficient if the
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before January 1.169 The taxpayer's subjective intent that the airplane nor-
mally would be kept outside the taxing jurisdiction was held insufficient to
create a tax situs independent of his personal domicile. 70 The issue of tax
situs for tangible personal property will continue to be important under the
new Property Tax Code. 17 1
Several cases during the year addressed valuation problems. Jones v.
Hutchinson County 172 addressed the constitutionality of article 7150k 173
which required that agricultural land be valued for ad valorem tax pur-
poses using a particular type of income capitalization method. The tax-
payer sought to require the tax assessor to apply article 7150k in valuing
his land. The county contended, and the court agreed, that the statute was
unconstitutional under Article VIII of the Texas Constitution. 174 In reach-
ing this decision, the court first determined that the term "value" as used in
Article VIII of the Texas Constitution meant market value.' 75 Because the
constitution required that valuation be based solely on the land's use for
agricultural purposes, and because article 7150k called for a valuation of
agricultural land on a basis other than the market value basis required by
the constitution, the court concluded that article 7150k was
unconstitutional. 176
Article VIII of the Texas Constitution also was relied upon to hold a
taxation method unconstitutional in Parker County v. Spindletop Oil & Gas
Co. 177 The taxpayers sued, claiming that their mineral interests were
taxed at full market value while other real property in the taxing jurisdic-
tion was assessed based on values below market. The court found that the
property is situated with a degree of permanency that will distinguish it from property on a
transitory basis in same location).
169. 615 S.W.2d at 319.
170. Id
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.02(4) (Vernon Pam. 1981) provides:
The owner resides (for property not used for business purposes) or maintains
his principal place of business in this state (for property used for business pur-
poses) in the unit and the property is taxable in this state but does not have a
taxable situs pursuant to subdivisions (1) through (3) of this section.
172. 615 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
173. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 318, § 2, at 847 (formerly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
7150k). Before its repeal, art. 7150k required that agricultural land be valued for ad valorem
tax purposes "on the basis of the category of the land supporting livestock or producing farm
crops or forest products using accepted income capitalization methods applied to average
net to land." It provided further that "[tihe value so determined shall never exceed the fair
market value of the land as determined by other appraisal methods." Id Similar language
is used in TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.52 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
174. 615 S.W.2d at 931. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 provides: "Taxation shall be equal
and uniform. All property in this State ... shall be taxed in proportion to its value ....
Id TEX. CO NST. art. VIII, § 1-d(a) states: "All land ... designated for agricultural use
...shall be assessed for all tax purposes on the consideration of only those factors relative
to such agricultural use." Id
175. 615 S.W.2d at 931; see Lively v. Missouri, K & T Ry. Co., 102 Tex. 545, 558, 120
S.W. 852, 856 (1909) (the value of property for tax purposes should be based on the price for
which it can be bought and sold).
176. 615 S.W.2d at 927. See also TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1098 (1977) (stating that
to change the valuation of agricultural land from market value would require a constitu-
tional amendment).
177. 612 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ granted).
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county and school districts' taxing methods discriminated against owners
of mineral interests, and violated the constitution's requirement that taxa-
tion be equal and uniform. 78
Banquete Independent School District v. Tenneco, Inc..179 provides an ex-
ample of a successful contest of one taxing authority's valuation method.
The school district utilized cost of reconstruction less physical depreciation
and obsolescence to value certain pipeline assets. While the taxpayer uti-
lized an income capitalization approach and a cost approach for its own
purposes, it argued that original cost less depreciation method of valuation
as required by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission most closely
reflected market value.' 80 The jury accepted the original cost less depreci-
ation valuation, and its verdict was upheld on appeal. 18' Although based
on substantive grounds, the case seems to stand primarily for the proposi-
tion that effective advocacy can make a difference.
Finally several cases addressed interesting procedural issues in the ad
valorem tax context. In Watkins v. Douglass 82 the court considered the
jurisdictional prerequisites to an appeal of a taxing authority's appraisal.
Section 4(b) of article 7345f required that the taxpayer set out the value of
his property "in a rendition filed prior to the Board of Equalization hear-
ings as required by law."' 83 Although the taxpayers failed to use official
forms and filed them with the taxing authorities only after the district's
equalization board's initial meeting, the court found that the requirements
of article 7345f were met. 184 The court held that the underlying purpose of
the statute was to provide relief to taxpayers from excessive valuation, and
that the statute should not be strictly construed against them. In addition,
the court decided that the board of equalization hearings prior to which
the rendition must be filed were those hearings on the value of the tax-
payer's property.' 85
In Bexar County v. Connell Leasing Co. 186 the court considered the re-
quirement of article 7206(5) that, whenever the taxing authorities raise the
"assessment of any person's property, they must give notice to the taxpayer
of the raise in value." 187 The taxing authorities, in previous years, had
utilized a twenty percent assessment ratio. However, for the year in con-
troversy they used a twenty-six percent ratio without giving notice to the
taxpayer. The court held that the increase in the assessment ratio consti-
tuted a raise in the "assessment," and that, therefore, notice was re-
quired.' 88 Consequently, the court held the tax increase void for failure to
178. Id at 948; TEX. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
179. 618 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
180. Id at 827.
181. Id. at 829.
182. 614 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
183. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 764, § 4(b), at 1913.
184. 614 S.W.2d at 895.
185. Id
186. 611 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
187. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7206(5) (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1981).
188. 611 S.W.2d at 499.
19821
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
meet the notice requirement. 8 9
In City of Dallas v. Dean Carlton, Inc. 190 the issue was whether the fail-
ure to name an aircraft owner on the Dallas Independent School District's
assessment roll rendered the assessment invalid. Applying article 7204,
which specified the manner and form for assessing property for taxa-
tion,' 9 ' the court concluded that such a failure was not fatal, and reversed
the lower court.' 92 The Dallas charter provision, based on article 7204,
provided "that a misnomer or failure to name the owner in the assessment
rolls shall not affect the validity of the assessment of any taxes."' 93 The
taxpayer argued that the misnomer provision applied only to supplemen-
tal, and not original assessments. The court found, however, that the rea-
son for the language in the misnomer provisions was to clarify the fact that
no supplemental assessment was required if the only defect in the original
assessment was an erroneous statement of the owner's name. 194 The appli-
cability of this case under the new Property Tax Code is unclear.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
Two federal cases dealt with the interrelationship between Texas laws of
community property and homestead and power of the federal government
to enforce federal tax liens against homesteads. In United States v. Rog-
ers 195 the deceased spouse of Mrs. Rogers had an unpaid tax liability in
the amount of $927,284.79. Mrs. Rogers had no tax liability of her own;
however, to satisfy her deceased spouse's liability the United States sought
to foreclose a lien on Mrs. Rogers' homestead, in which her deceased hus-
band had had a community interest. Affirming the district court, the court
of appeals held that the federal government could not foreclose a federal
tax lien on a delinquent taxpayer's Texas homestead to satisfy his tax lia-
bility when the taxpayer's spouse, also having an interest in the homestead,
had no federal tax liability. 196 In so holding, the court drew a distinction
between a homestead arising under laws creating merely an exemption for
general creditors and a homestead arising under laws conferring a present
property right in the person possessing the homestead. '97 Because Mrs.
Rogers' homestead interest was found to be a property right under Texas
law, the court prohibited the enforcement of the federal tax lien against the
homestead property for as long as Mrs. Rogers maintained her homestead
189. Id See also Zavala Co. v. EDK Ranches, Inc., 544 S.W.2d 484 (rex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1976, no writ) (due process requires that the taxpayer receive notice where the
assessment ratio is increased).
190. 611 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
191. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7204 (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1981). The name of
the owner was also required to be shown on the assessment rolls. Id
192. 611 S.W.2d at 446.
193. Id
194. Id
195. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981).
196. Id at 1124.
197. Id at 1127.
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interest.' 98 In a companion case, Ingram v. City of Dallas Department of
Housing & Urban Rehabilitation,99 the court applied the principles of Rog-
ers in a more complicated fact situation involving spouses' joint tax liabil-
ity and the sole liability of one of the spouses. The government sought to
sell the homestead for the husband's tax liability, but the appellate court
refused to allow foreclosure for the reasons articulated in Rogers.2°
One Texas case, Fairmont Dallas Restaurants, Inc. v. McBeath,20 ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the imposition of a higher gross receipts tax
on mixed beverages sold by restaurants than on mixed beverages sold by
airlines. 20 2 The court found that the separate classification of airlines had
a reasonable basis because of the distinct service offered by airlines, and
therefore held that the statutes were constitutional.20 3
Finally, Kennedy v. Kennedy2°4 emphasized the care with which prop-
erty settlement agreements in divorce actions should be drafted so as to
avoid unanticipated federal tax consequences. In Kennedy the property
settlement included the following clause: "Each of the parties shall file
separate income tax returns for 1975 and thereafter and shall pay all taxes
due with respect thereto.120 5 Mrs. Kennedy paid taxes in 1975 on her spe-
cial community income actually earned by her, but she did not pay income
taxes with respect to income earned by her ex-husband. The court found
that the agreement was unambiguous, despite Mrs. Kennedy's objections,
and held that she was liable for income taxes on one-half of the commu-
nity income earned by both parties up to the date of divorce.206
Miscellaneous significant legislative enactments include the Manufac-
tured Housing Sales and Use Tax Act which exempts mobile homes from
the motor vehicle sales tax, and instead imposes a new manufactured hous-
ing sales and use tax on such homes.207 Tax Code section 152.089 clarifies
the taxation of motor vehicles that are purchased outside Texas and subse-
quently brought into Texas.208 A four percent motor vehicle sales and use
tax is imposed thereon, but the amount is reduced to reflect the percentage
of miles operated in Texas and to give credit for sales and use taxes paid in
other states.2°9 Tax Code sections 153.101-.123210 all make alterations in
198. Id But see Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1973).
Both cases held that state exemption laws fail to protect property against federal tax liens.
199. 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
200. Id at 1131-32.
201. 618 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
202. Compare TEx. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 202.02 (Vernon 1978) (placing a 10% tax
on the gross receipts of a licensee selling and preparing mixed beverages) with id § 34.04(Vernon 1978) (imposing a five cent service fee on each individual beverage sold on a com-
mercial passenger aircraft).
203. 618 S.W.2d at 934.
204. 619 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
205. Id at 410.
206. Id
207. 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 815, § 5, at 3090 (Vernon), to be codified at TEx.
TA.-GEN. ANN. arts. 25.01-.15 (effective March 1, 1982).
208. TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 152.089 (Vernon Pam. 1981).
209. Id
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certain aspects of the fuel taxes. Section 154.050 relates to certain dead-
lines for paying for cigarette stamps or meter settings,2t1 and section
156.153 permits hotels collecting the hotel occupancy tax to retain a por-
tion of it as reimbursement for the cost of collecting the tax.212 Finally, the
annual occupation tax on coin operated machines designed exclusively for
showing motion pictures was increased from $15 to $1,500.213
210. See id §§ 153.101-. 123. Certain changes, primarily of a technical nature, were also
made regarding the gasoline and diesel fuel taxes imposed on single deliveries of 5,000 gal-
lons or more, or, under certain circumstances, single deliveries of lesser quantities. Id
§ 153.103. Certain sales of aviation fuel from one dealer to another are exempt from the
gasoline and diesel fuel excise taxes. Id § 153.104(5).
211. Id § 154.050.
212. Id § 156.153.
213. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8802(i) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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